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In 2013, other articles in the state media tied the notion of the China Dream to the catchphrase of Shared Destiny, describing the China Dream itself as a Community of Shared Destiny (distinguishing itself from the American Dream of individual freedom). According to an earlier article published by the state news agency Xinhua, this is a community 'in which the interests of nation and state and the interests of each and every person become intricately linked, such that when people are encouraged to establish their own ideals, they also create the conditions for everyone else to realise their ideals'.
These long-winded formulations are a product of what China's party leaders, and the party theorists who help write their speeches, call tifa 提 法: 'formulations', or correct formulas for the expression of key political or ideological concepts. Intentionally vague and circular statements, these formulations are an essential part of China's official language because they can be made to fit a wide variety of situations. Phrases like 'to link one's personal future and destiny with the nation and state's future and destiny' are word-strings, designed for repetition, like a pledge or a mantra of intellectual fealty.
Formulations/Tifa
The Party's leaders and theorists are the keepers of a language that is designed to guide people's actions and thoughts while reinforcing the notion of one-party rule as China's historical destiny. Many of these didactic formulations have the authority of scripture. But while the party's rhetoricians must employ standard, revered and authoritative formulations in the Party's lexicon, they cannot rely on repetition alone as the old formulations do not always stretch to cover new circumstances, answer fresh challenges or express refinements of ideology. In order to establish themselves as unique contributors to China's advancement, and secure their place in history, the leaders and theorists thus seek to develop new tifa within the constraints set by the diction and vocabulary of their predecessors. The way they refine the concept of Shared Destiny, for example, will determine their future place in history as well as their careers and livelihood in the present day.
In 2013-2014, as Xi Jinping's new administration sought to rein in corruption and pollution, redress inequalities and reform the law, it cautiously updated the official language. It employed words like 'destiny', 'history' and 'mission' to lend Xi's leadership an image of strength and boost the legitimacy of one-party rule.
As noted in the China Story Yearbook 2013, China's former president and party general secretary Hu Jintao was prone to overuse impersonal tifa in his speech, for which he was widely parodied in Weibo posts that told him to 'speak like a human being'. Xi Jinping, by contrast, initially attracted praise for being plain-spoken, part of his carefully cultivated image as a 'man of the people'.
Rumours and Big Vs
By August 2013, when Xi showed himself to be even less tolerant of dissent than his predecessor, the praise gave way to pensive silence. That month, his administration launched a fresh, strict crackdown on online 'rumours' with the arrests of Charles Xue 薛必群 and Wang Gongquan 王 功权, wealthy venture capitalists and microbloggers who had carved out a big presence on the Internet with their liberal views and enthusiastic support for a range of social causes. Xue and Wang were 'Big Vs' -a term used to describe popular microbloggers with verified (V) real-name Weibo accounts and whose followers numbered in the millions.
Hu Jintao began the campaign against 'rumours' in 2012 under the pretext of protecting the public from fake news, but Xi has pursued it vigorously. The detention of Xue, Wang and others, and their abject televised confessions (see Forum 'Orange as the New Black', p.316) showed Xi's de-152 153 termination to guide and contain public discourse. Although the detainees received plenty of messages of support from outside China, the Party effectively demonstrated that even 'Big Vs' posed no threat to its power.
Xue had more than twelve million Weibo followers before his account was shut down and Wang 1.5 million. Their public humiliation cowed many other 'Big Vs' as well as less prominent and well-financed netizens into self-censorship and silence.
Ideology Recalibrated
For all their 'anti-rumour mongering' rhetoric, China's Party leaders are experts at using innuendo to keep people guessing and uncertain. A case in point is the address that Xi gave on 19 August 2013 to propaganda officials at the National Ideological Work Conference in Beijing (noted in our 2013 Yearbook), which state media reports promptly trumpeted as his 'important speech of 19 August' without revealing its detailed contents.
In the weeks that followed, numerous editorials and commentaries about Xi's 'important speech' appeared in key party newspapers and websites but only broadly hinting at its content: articles in the People's Liberation Army Daily and China Youth Daily on 21 August and 26 August, for example, mentioned 'positive propaganda' and 'the struggle for public opinion'.
In November, an unverified document purporting to be a leaked transcript of the speech began circulating on the Internet. Independent commentators posting on websites hosted outside China were confident that the document was genuine because its content reflected what had been said about the speech in party publications that had appeared in the intervening months.
To date, the full official text of Xi's speech has not been made public and the authorities have neither confirmed nor denied the leaked document's authenticity. Instead, the state media has mainly quoted others talking about it: provincial propaganda chiefs, senior editors at leading Qian identified the term 'the struggle for public opinion' 舆论斗争 as the key to understanding the priority Xi placed on suppressing dissent. Qian noted that the term was a throwback to the early post-Mao period:
it first appeared in a People's Daily editorial of 1980, four years after Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution, when there was still raw and fierce debate over the legacies of both. Qian argued that whereas Xi's administration has previously used 'the struggle for public opinion' to justify tighter censorship to protect mainland public culture from Western 'spiritual pollution', it was now also targeting critical debate within China itself.
Qian noted that the initial Xinhua report of 20 August 2013, which he said bore the marks of a 'rigid process of examination and authorisation', made no mention of the 'struggle for public opinion'. The term was also missing from eight subsequent People's Daily commentaries about Xi's speech that appeared from 21 August onwards. Yet on 24 August, the Global Times, the jingoistic subsidiary of People's Daily published an editorial titled 'The Struggle for Public Opinion', which it described as 'an unavoidable challenge to be faced head on' 舆论斗争，不能回避只能迎接的挑战.
After ten days of not mentioning the 'struggle', on 30 August 2013, the People's Daily published a lengthy editorial that cited Xi as explicitly calling for 'the struggle for public opinion' so as to 'effectively channel public opinion'. More lengthy articles followed in September promoting the idea. 
Unsheathing the Sword
Of all the slogans associated with 'the struggle for public opinion', the most 
Back to Nature
The unverified transcript of the 19 August speech also shows Xi calling for renewed attention to the 'relationship between the nature of the Party and the nature of the people'. The 'nature of the Party' is described as 'wholehearted service to the people' in the form of 'a Marxist political organisation that is of and for the people'. The transcript highlights the importance of Party officials not alienating the people. Understanding the 'nature of the people' means heeding the different 'ideological and cultural needs' of different groups: 'workers, peasants, PLA soldiers, cadres, intellectuals, the elderly, the young, children' as well as new group identities such as 'the ant-tribe' 蚁族 (college-educated, low-income workers living in city slums); 'northward drifters' 北漂 (job-seeking college graduates from the south living in Beijing); 'returned students' 海归 (the term is a homophone for 'sea turtles', referring to people with overseas qualifications); 'unemployed returned students' 海待 (the term sounds like 'seaweed'); and 'small investors' 散户 (literally, 'scattered households'). 
Scripting Destiny
Inequality has always dogged China's one-party system, as unaccounta- ent Evan Osnos's description). The gap between its ideology and practice poses a challenge to the party-state. But a greater challenge comes from the fact that Chinese citizens are, in ever increasing numbers, culturally, politically, academically and socially engaged with the world beyond the control of China's rulers. Moreover, the world -including global virtual communities of shared interests, the international media, environmental and rights activists and organisations -is engaging right back.
In June 2014, both the neo-Maoist Utopia website and Qiushi re-posted a Weibo post by the self-styled Maoist Yin Guoming 尹国明 in which he likened public intellectuals 公知 and the democracy movement 民运 to an 'evil cult'. In China, the term 'public intellectuals' often signifies writers, academics and others who engage in public discourse that has not been sanctioned by the Party. Yin claimed that some who identified as such, or as democracy activists, had links to terrorist groups or banned religious organisations ('evil cults' in the official vocabulary) such as the controversial Church of Almighty God 全能神教会 (see Forum 'Almighty God: Murder in a McDonald's', p.304). Qiushi included a disclaimer saying that the views expressed were those of the author and that Qiushi had not verified these claims.
That Qiushi was prepared to publish a text it acknowledged as potentially unreliable left readers in no doubt that the Party's campaign against rumour-mongering exempted rumours that served its own purposes. Party rhetoric has become notably hostile towards 'intellectuals' 知识分子, 
Yang Zhenwu on Xi Jinping
In the 28 May 2014 edition of the People's Daily, editor Yang Zhenwu 杨振武 explicated a range of Xi Jinping's speeches regarding the media's responsibility to guide public opinion.
Yang's explanations, recapped on the paper's website the following day in a handy textcommentary form for easy reading, covered subjects ranging from confidence in China's unique path of development, to materialism and dialectics and the appropriate methods for disseminating propaganda. Yang interpreted Xi's remark that 'Ideas and beliefs are the bones of the spirit of Party members', as a call for propaganda workers to remain steadfast in their beliefs, and discussed the importance of the 'main melody' 主旋律 and 'positive energy' 正能量 as values.
Hands: Invisible and Visible 看不见的手/看得见的手
At a Politburo meeting on 26 May concerning the government's role in market resource allocation, Xi Jinping stressed the need to use both the 'invisible' hand of the market and the 'visible' hand of the government. In its discussion of 'deepening reforms' at the time of the Third Plenum in October 2013, the People's Daily had called for a more effective use of 'visible hands', since 'the market only has vitality through cautious action by the government' 政 府慎作为， 市场才有活力. Presaging the theme of the Fourth Plenum in October 2014, the article refers to 'letting the "visible hands" wear the "gloves" of the rule of law'.
Zero Tolerance 零容忍
Xi Jinping has called for 'zero tolerance' in a number of areas, including threats to state security (in particular, the 'three evil forces' of terrorism, separatism, and extremism), corruption, violations of party discipline, work safety infractions and repugnant behaviour by law enforcement and justice officials. 
Kin in Grass Sandals

Vulgar Tycoon or Nouveau Riche 土豪
The term tuhao, originally meaning 'local strongman', was first used online to describe
Internet gamers who spent large amounts of money on in-game items to impress other players. Since late 2013, the term has described people of tremendous wealth but uncouth ways and poor taste. It has also become a teasing term of endearment among friends used when one splurges on some indulgence.
You Understand … 你懂的
Originating in a song by the singer and comedic actor Xiao Shenyang 小沈阳, the phrase ni dongde soon took a life of its own as a verbal wink between two people in the know as a placeholder to disguise political or social commentary or explain its absence. Even government officials have taken it up: asked at a press conference on 2 March 2014 for details about the corruption investigation into former Politburo member Zhou Yongkang, which
had not yet been formally announced, Lü Xinhua 吕新华, a spokesperson for the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference blathered for a few minutes and then simply said, 'ni dongde'.
Cherish What You Have 且行且珍惜
After a Weibo user exposed an extra-marital affair by actor Wen Zhang 文章, his wife Ma Yili 马伊琍 posted this response: 'Although love is easy, marriage is difficult -cherish what you have'. The last five characters 且行且珍惜 (pronounced qie xing qie zhenxi) became an Internet meme, spawning a slew of similar terms using the formula qie X qie XX, for example 'Eating is easy, losing weight is not, cherish what you eat 吃饭虽易， 减肥不易， 且吃且珍惜 .
No Zuo No Die or No 作 No Die (sometimes rendered as 不作死就不会死)
This Chinglish phrase sometimes written as no zuo no die; sometimes as no 作 no die, began as slang from the Chinese north-east. Internet users use it to mean that if you don't do something stupid in the first place, you don't have to worry about it coming back later to haunt you. Air Quality Index, which is less stringent than international standards, caused China's pollution to be reported 'in a misleading way, blocking public understanding and enabling official inaction'. Another example is the enforcement of the ideal of 'maintaining a unified approach' 统一口径 in news coverage, when it has often been independent investigative journalists who have exposed many serious problems, especially those related to corruption in local areas. The second half of the phrase in Chinese, 口径 (pronounced koujing) signifies the calibre or bore of a gun, which lends the phrase the sense of a line of matched guns all firing in unison.
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The Spring and Autumn Style 春秋笔法, by Geremie R Barmé
One of the main features of New China Newspeak 新华文体 is its 'moral-evaluative' dimension. In this it builds on patterns of moral judgment used by writers in pre-modern times, be they historical, cultural or artistic judgments. For those who would use the past as a mirror to guide present actions, evaluations and moral judgments were crucial.
It is the concern of many students of things Chinese (be they in or outside China) that the yawning gap between reality and rhetoric should, in the long run, make things untenable, or lead to some massive revision or collapse of the vestigial ideological power of the party-state. Taking a sideways glance at the parallels between Soviet and Chinese socialism, however, and if we remain mindful of the lessons that have been learnt from the Soviet collapse, one could say that party-state rule in China has created a range of appealing and abiding ideological simulacra. To date these have incorporated cultural alternatives and opponents in a 'postmodern pastiche' of the kind originally described in the Russian philosopher Mikhail Epstein's work on the former Soviet ideological landscape. This kind of pastiche has also been commented on (and denounced) by China's own New Left and retro-Maoists.
In his work on relativistic patterns in totalitarian thinking, Mikhail Epstein analysed totalitarianism as 'a specific postmodern model that came to replace the modernist ideological stance elaborated in earlier Marxism'. He argued that the use of what he called 'descriptive-evaluative' words, that is terms that combine both descriptive and evaluative meanings or connotations -'ideologemes' employed universally in Soviet speech -communicate not only information but also a specific ideological message, or concealed judgments that take the form of words. Epstein's view of how ideologemes functioned in Soviet public discourse finds striking parallels in reformist-era China (1978-) . In short, Epstein noted that a key to the function of ideologemes is that they can encompass both leftist and rightist concepts, embracing the spectrum of utilitarian shifts made within a totalitarian or rather a totalising system, that is a system that can incorporate and reconcile logical inconsistencies and opposing ideas.
A simple example of this can be found in the expression 'socialist market economy'. It is a term created to convey the extreme contradictions within contemporary economic realities; it is an expression that allows for an ideological underpinning to what, superficially at least, appears to have been an example of the party's retreat from its avowed state-centred Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionary ideals. According Source: dur.ac.uk to Epstein, this kind of linguistic formulation is not the result of a desperate pragmatism; rather it is the reflection of the core philosophy of a politics which 'uses leftist slogans to defeat the right, rightist slogans to defeat the left', a politics that strives throughout to maintain its own primacy. This is a primacy that is not merely about temporal power, but one that is also about dominion in the realms of ideas and emotions. These informal honorifics that elevate Xi to a folkloric hero, national manager and beloved patriarch are a new development in the sphere of ideological work. By 'unsheathing the sword', the party-state under Xi has cut through an official language hidebound by precedents to establish a Community of Shared Destiny. Yet the Chinese word for destiny, mingyun 命运, can also mean 'fate' (see Information Window 'Mingyun 命运, the "Destiny" in "Shared Destiny" ', p.xii).
Mikhail Epstein
Whereas destiny foretells a happy end, fate can progress to gloom and doom. The official interpretation of mingyun, however, in this case, excludes 'fate' -in the rhetoric of the party-state, destiny can only be positive.
Big Daddy Xi -'Photoshopped' images of President Xi holding a yellow umbrella were used at various pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The political meme went viral on social media Source: hkfuture2047.wordpress.com
